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NAIVE REALISM 
IN PHILOSOPHY OF LITERATURE 
The journal Philosophy and Literature is one 
of the leading locations for contemporary discus­
sions of the relations between philosophy and lit­
erature. Recently the journal came out with its 
20th Anniversary Issue, a copy of which I re­
ceived because I had written a book review for the 
issue. For the fun of it I decided to read the issue 
from front to back. I was struck by how many of 
the articles were committed to some form of what 
has traditionally been called naive realism. 1 
Much is said positively about science and scien­
tific method, whereas schools of thought that 
have often criticized naive realism, for example 
post-structuralism and Rortyan pragmatism, 
come under frequent attack. This is not surpris­
ing, given that the editorial, by Dennis Dutton 
and Patrick Henry, focuses on Alan Sokal's ex­
planation of his now famous hoax against the 
well-known cultural studies journal Social Text.' 
While reading the issue it occurred to me that 
journals are units of cultural production, and that 
they should be as open to discussion and critique 
as anything else. Although it would be difficult to 
read the entire production of a journal, a special 
anniversary issue would surely represent the gen­
eral point of view of the editors and the contribu­
tors. 
Someone might object to criticism of one 
journal appearing in another, for example in Phi­
losophy Today. It is my view that writing a cri­
tique of this sort is not fundamentally different 
from writing a review of an edited collection of 
essays. It should also be stressed that I have no in­
tention to denigrate the work of the editors of 
Philosophy of Literature, which I consider to be a 
fine publication. My only desire is to open up 
new avenues of discussion for the issues raised in 
that journal. • 
My general claim then is that the anniversary 
issue of Philosophy and Literature, taken as a 
whole, is a defense of naive realism against the 
various opponents of that position. (I shall call 
this defense of naive realism "the new realism.") 
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We certainly need some sort of corrective against 
the recent excesses of postmodern literary theory 
and philosophy. But pendulum swings have a 
way of overcorrecting. Nothing is being said by 
any of the authors found in this issue about the 
limits or possible disadvantages of naive realism, 
or of the metaphysical assumptions behind that 
position. 
Part of reason why these assumptions are not 
addressed is that the awfulness of the opposition 
seems so glaring. The new realists frequently and 
gleefully point to the inscrutable jargon, incon­
sistencies and bad arguments of their opponents. 
(Editor, Dennis Dutton, runs a well-known an­
nual Bad Writing Contest for the "ugliest, most 
stylistically awful single sentence--or string of 
no more than three sentences--found in a pub­
lished scholarly book or article."5 Some of the 
winners are simply stunning.) This may lead 
them to believe that a combination of clarity, 
logic and scientific method will save literary 
studies and philosophy from the barbarians. 
These concerns are certainly legitimate, and 
nothing I will say here is intended to justify 
poststructuralist outrages. I would simply like us 
to engage in a bit of hopefully jargon-free and 
clear-headed questioning about new realism it­
self. 
First, a comment about the term "realism." 
Most people would consider themselves realists 
in some sense. I certainly do. Those who, like 
myself, are opposed to, or at least critical of the 
version of realism found in these pages tend tore­
fer to it as "naive realism." The true realism, on 
our account, is not naive. Naive realism is not 
truly realist, not realistic enough. It was a sad 
mistake for critics of naive realism to have called 
themselves anti-realists, since this allowed the 
term "realism" to remain in the hands of their op­
ponents. 
The most fundamental assumption of naive 
realism is existence, stability, independence and 
ideal determinability of facts. The naive realist 
SPRING 1999 
Naive realism in philosophy of literature 
Leddy, Thomas W 
Philosophy Today; Spring 1999; 43, 1; Arts & Humanities Full Text 
pg. 100 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
would not go so far as to say, with Wittgenstein, 
that the world is all that is the case. But the naive 
realist believes that there is, indeed, all that is the 
case. For naive realism, the truth is the truth, the 
facts are the facts. Naive realists believe that the 
world is totally independent of our interpreta­
tions of it. They believe that, as confused as our 
representations may be, the world itself is clear; 
and that the distinctions between things, espe­
cially things referred to by accurately developed 
abstract ideas, are sharply defined. Thus, knowl­
edge for the naive realist is simply a matter ofbe­
coming clear about these real-world distinctions. 
Here's an example of a naive realist assump­
tion. Wendell V. Harris asks "Which of us could 
give a complete and accurate report of everything 
we did yesterday?"6 Harris assumes in the very 
asking of this question that there is such a thing as 
everything we did yesterday, and that there could, 
ideally, be a complete and accurate report of it, 
even though none of us mortals could actually 
produce it. Since Harris admits that no such ac­
count has ever been given then what evidence 
does he have for its existence?7 
There is no denying that the naive realist 
model of the world works very well in most con­
texts. It is self-consistent, elegant, explains 
much, and seems to make those who believe in it 
comfortable and productive. Naive realists are 
sensible people, and cheerful too. They may even 
make better social activists or better scientists, as 
William Sokal suggests in his article. Sokal de­
scribes himself as a "stodgy old scientist who be­
lieves, naively, that there exists an external world, 
and there exist objective truths about that world, 
and that my job is to discover some of them."' 
This is a pretty good summary of the position of 
the new realist. 
This attitude is fine for natural scientists. 
Sokal, a physicist, rightly satirizes those who 
wish to play literary games with quantum me­
chanics. But naive realists are, I believe, deeply 
wrong when they assume that naive realism tells 
the whole story about reality; that there is an ulti­
mately clear distinction between external and in­
ternal reality; that objective truths are simply and 
purely objective; and that discovery is simply and 
purely discovery. 
The epistemological and metaphysical point I 
wish to make is a simple one. Naive realists be­
lieve that the world is fundamentally clear and 
distinct. But there is no good reason to believe 
that the world is so, and much reason to believe 
that it is not. 
In doing some research on Indian Aesthetics I 
recently ran across an old article by Archie J. 
Bahm which will help me to make my point.9 
Bahm notes that a basic distinction between In­
dian and Western philosophy is that the Indian 
philosopher believes that ultimate reality is fun­
damentally indistinct, whereas the Westerner be­
lieves that it is fundamentally distinct. ("Advaita 
Vedanta calls ultimate reality 'Nirguna Brah­
man,' being without qualities. Samkyhya-Yoga 
philosophers call the ultimate state of purusha 
(soul) kaivalya, perfect liberation from all limita­
tions. Theravada and Sunyavada Buddhists call it 
'Nibbana' (Nirvana, no wind) .... All [of these 
schools] alike, despite their other metaphysical 
disagreements, depict ultimacy as pure indis­
tinctness.")10 Indian philosophy then holds that 
reality is beyond reason "for reason begins to act 
by making distinctions, and rationality exists 
only where there are ratios, relationships, differ­
ences, and distinctness." I am not using this quote 
to advocate any essentialist distinctions between 
India and the West. My point is simply that at 
least some people, for example most of the writ­
ers for the 20th anniversary issue of Philosophy 
and Literature, assume the view that Bahm de­
scribes as Western, i.e. that the world is funda­
mentally distinct. Nor am I saying that this alter­
native position is correct. There is no more reason 
to think that the world is ultimately indistinct 
than to think that it is ultimately distinct. The 
point is that there is a range of reasonable possi­
bility here----one not considered by naive realists. 
A historical note: the view that the world is 
distinct was dominant in analytic philosophy of 
the first half of the century: was contained in the 
very notion of "analysis." The new realists sim­
ply apply the idea of analysis beyond language to 
reality itself. The analytic philosophers were a bit 
more modest, but then the success of modern sci­
ence was a bit more modest then too. Each dis­
covery of a new human genetic propensity or of a 
new planet beyond the solar system seems to sup­
port the view that the world itself is clear and dis­
tinct. And yet, we know all too well that attempts 
to find clear and distinct categories in human 
matters often lead to distortion, as can be seen for 
example in the troubles entailed by 11 
mathematization of economics. 
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Is there any reason to believe that the human 
world (the world as we experience it with refer­
ence to human values and concerns) is ultimately 
clear and distinct? Take for example the problem 
of intentions, so central to the theory of interpre­
tation. Do we have any reason to believe that the 
intentions of authors are clearly and distinctly 
there to be discovered? Do we have any reason to 
believe that they are there in the same way that 
pennies in a jar are there? Maybe they are there, 
but not in a way anything like the way that pen­
nies in ajar are there. I will have something to say 
about this later on. 
The point I want to make here is metaphysical: 
that there is reason to believe that an aspect of re­
ality itself is ultimately indistinct. This is similar 
to a point I have made elsewhere, that there is a 
fundamentally metaphorical aspect of reality. 1' 
The current crop of naive realists are not, to their 
credit, opposed to metaphors. However they only 
find metaphors valuable as devices that can help 
reveal a reality that is fundamentally not meta­
phorical. (This comes out explicitly, for instance, 
in Susan Haack's article). 13 This is why naive re­
alists generally reject the notion of metaphorical 
truth, or believe that metaphorical truths are true 
only to the extent that they may be translated into 
something that is literally true. 
This all leads us back to the old debate be­
tween philosophy and literature, famously re­
ferred to by Plato. There is an intuition, contained 
within literature itself, that there is a fundamen­
tally metaphorical aspect to reality, or maybe 
even that reality itself is ultimately metaphorical, 
contradictory, or paradoxical. I am not saying 
that literary theorists believe this: many of them 
are on the side of the philosophical mainstream 
on this issue. I do think that most creative writers 
and some philosophers (against the example of 
Plato) would agree that at least some aspect of re­
ality is itself metaphorical. 
To argue this is not to give up the concept of 
truth, any more than it is to give up realism. A 
look at Susan Haack's article will help to articu­
late this point. Haack thinks that philosophy 
should be scientific in Peirce's sense: that philos­
ophers should crave to know how things really 
are, seek the truth, and do so through a scientific 
method which, in Peirce's view, requires close at­
tention to the character of everyday experience, 
not laboratory experimentation. Philosophy, on 
this view, explores the "·universe of mind" just as 
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astronomers explore the stars. Haack, in support­
ing Peirce, seeks to navigate between the Scylla 
of displacement of philosophy by the natural sci­
ences, and the Charybdis of its replacement by 
the literary. Nothing is wrong with this so far. 
However, Haack's call for a return to Peirce is 
for a return to naive realism. Peirce's idea that 
some items in philosophy will be "finally settled" 
is a mark of this position. Peirce accepts the false 
dichotomy that either philosophical questions 
will be finally settled, or philosophy is a mere ex­
ercise of cleverness. Haack joins Peirce in attack­
ing philosophy done in a literary spirit. She 
thinks such philosophy is a version of"fake rea­
soning," which occurs when the reasoner is indif­
ferent to the truth value of the proposition pro­
pounded. Yet conviction that philosophical 
questions will never be settled, and partaking in 
literary spirit, does not necessarily mean a lack of 
commitment to truth. 
The reduction of truth to the truth value of 
propositions is another sign of naive realism. It 
assumes that propositions, properly dated, are 
eternally and unchangingly true or false. Naive 
realism is strangely like Platonism in this respect. 
Its eternal Forms are dated propositions. How 
could such a view be supported empirically? In 
any case, there are other theories of truth not 
committed to naive realism, for instance the prag­
matism of James and Dewey, or Heidegger's dy­
namic notion of truth as unconcealment ofBeing. 
Haack sharply contrasts the aesthetic and the 
true. She argues that the highest priorities of 
philosophical writing should be "not elegance, 
euphony, allusion, suggestiveness, but clarity, 
precision, explicitness, directness." 14 But what if 
accepting these as the highest priorities would be 
inconsistent with the search for truth, for exam­
ple when doing so distorts the unclear, imprecise, 
and indirect nature of the subject under study? 
Why assume that the qualities desirable in philo­
sophical and scientific writing are the same, and 
that philosophy and science stand together in op­
position to literature on this? 
I am not questioning the value of clarity and 
precision as such, but the assumption that all of 
reality is amenable to this approach, and that sug­
gestiveness, for example, could never be the best 
way to reveal reality or truth. Peirce and Haack 
almost recognize this themselves when they 
stress the importance of metaphor for philosophy 
and science, but they do not take the next impor-
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tant step of recognizing a metaphorical aspect of 
reality itself. 
One can agree with Haack's general point that 
priorities of philosophical writing are different 
from literary priorities. The problem is that 
Haack fails to see that poetry may sometimes just 
get at truth better than philosophy. Haack con­
cedes that works ofliterature may express philo­
sophical insights. But that is not enough. She still 
assumes that literature cannot express philosoph­
ical ideas as well as philosophy, since philosophy 
is explicit, direct and univocal, and literature is 
not. This ignores the possibility that literature can 
occasionally get at truth better than philosophy 
precisely because, or precisely when, it is not ex­
plicit, direct and univocal (and that philosophy it­
self can sometimes do better when it is not so ex­
plicit, direct, and literal-minded). It is doubtful 
for instance whether a philosopher has ever said 
anything about the nature of tragedy or love 
which has not been said better in literature. It 
seems these days that most of the interesting 
things being said by philosophers about such 
things are being said through philosophical inter­
pretation ofliterature, as in Nussbaum's article in 
this issue. 15 
None of this, however, need lead us to agree 
with a comment of Richard Rorty's mentioned by 
Haack that to call a statement true is just to give it 
a rhetorical pat on the back, or simply to say that 
it is a belief with which we are able to agree. One 
need not side with Rorty in holding that philoso­
phy or science are merely types ofliterature in or­
der to oppose Haack. 16 The truth about truth is to 
be found, I believe, someplace between Haack 
and Rorty. Philosophy is not reducible to rhetoric 
and literature, but philosophy must come to rec­
ognize that truth, rhetoric, and narrative are ines­
capably bound together. 
There is a disturbing tendency in many of the 
articles in this issue to understand the field of de­
bate as simply consisting of two extremes. Sokal 
for instance poses his own good objectivism 
against bad subjectivism. He heads off any possi­
bility of finding a position between the view that 
non-context-dependent beliefs exist and can be 
true, and the view that beliefs are only socially 
accepted as true ("culturalism"). He insists that 
people who want to make social change must ac­
cept the first of these, or else throw out the idea 
that the Nazi gas chambers were evil, as well as 
the truth of quantum mechanics. Sokal thinks that 
not accepting the first position is inevitably to ac­
cept the second. He doesn't consider that it might 
just be very useful in certain contexts to believe 
that non-context-dependent beliefs exist even 
though nothing is ever totally independent of 
context, and that this view can be consistent with 
rejecting culturalism. 
This black-or-white attitude can be found in a 
willingness to accuse others of self­
contradiction. Wendell Harris, for instance, at­
tacks post-structuralists for contradicting them­
selves about the existence of such a thing as "the 
author's intentions." I am not opposed to attack­
ing people for self-contradiction. But are the 
self-contradictions really there? Are they not 
usually, and to a large degree, constructions of 
the reading; for example, in this case, of Harris's 
reading of post -structuralists? 
Let us consider for a moment the structure of 
accusations of self-contradiction. It is seldom no­
ticed that to find actual instances of sentences of 
the form "p and •p" is rare. One usually has to in­
terpret what is said as "p and •p." And since peo­
ple do not generally intend to contradict them­
selves, one has to interpret what is said (or 
written) as "p and --,p" against their implied or 
even stated intentions! Thus a possible reply to 
Harris is that the poststructuralist's apparent 
self-contradictions are in fact Harris's own 
readerly constructions. 
But I think this is only partly right. It makes 
more sense to say that self-contradictions are re­
ally there, and they are (in part) constructions. 
That is, they are really there potentially, and actu­
alized in construction. 
The same point goes with intentions. Contra 
Harris, post-structuralists need not contradict 
themselves when they look at the author's in­
tended meaning, since to accept the existence of 
intended meaning is not necessarily to accept the 
naive realist view of intentions as concrete histor­
ically unchanging objects. One can be a realist 
about intentions without being a naive realist 
about intentions; that is, without accepting that 
there are eternal unchanging facts about inten­
tions, or that they exist totally independent of our 
interpretations of them. 
Paisley Livingston is also a naive realist about 
intentions although he qualifies this somewhat, 
drawing from Jerrold Levinson's discussion of 
the concept of oeuvre. 17 Levinson rejects the radi­
cal historicist idea that a work's artistic content 
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can change. For both Levinson and Livingston 
Moby Dick did not acquire any new artistic con­
tent because of Joyce even though our knowl­
edge of Joyce may help us to discover new as­
pects of Melville. 
That seems fine on the surface, and probably 
works for everyday practice. But it assumes that 
aspects of Melville's writing are in the writing 
fully actualized, fully distinguished from each 
other, prior to our interpretation of them. The as­
sumption is based on nothing. At best, it is a use­
ful myth. Any aspect that is found is found after 
or through our interpretation of the work. Since 
naive realists think that such qualities are clearly 
and distinctly there, like pennies in a jar, they in­
terpret the radical historicist claim as holding that 
Joyce's work adds new qualities to Moby Dick. 
That's a wrong interpretation of radical 
historicism since it assumes that Moby Dick had a 
determinate set of qualities prior to any interpre­
tation. Levinson and Livingston are attacking a 
straw man. 
Aspects are not like pennies in a jar: they 
emerge through interaction between the readers 
and the text, and if the reader is influenced by 
Joyce then the aspect that emerges is one that 
could not have emerged earlier. It is a false di­
chotomy to say either we discover aspects or we 
just add them to the work: the discovered aspects 
are also constructed. It might be replied that this 
is a paradox: "how can something be both discov­
ered and constructed at the same time?" Yet the 
paradox is unresolvable only if one believes that 
reality is ultimately clear and distinct. It is only 
unresolvable if the distinction between discovery 
and construction is rigid .. 
Livingston and Levinson do allow for moder­
ate retroactivism (the view that meaning of a text 
changes after completion of the text) as long as 
we stay within the author's oeuvre. Yet why 
should the author be the only privileged party? 
Why couldn't we speak just as well of the oeuvre 
of the school of writing, or even of the nation? 
Why can't we speak of collective retroactive 
intentionality? As soon as this is allowed naive 
realism begins to dissolve. 
Just as some authors make naive realist as­
sumptions about author's intentions, others make 
such assumptions about the reader's response. 
For example, Roger Seamon looks for an expla­
nation of poetry's power in rapid unconscious in­
ferences." He believes that the poet presents the 
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reader with contrasted meanings that defeat nor­
mal expectations, and that the reader is then 
forced to bridge gaps in order to make sense of 
the words. Seamon understands reading litera­
ture along the lines of getting the point (')fa joke: a 
gap is opened up by the author, which the reader 
fills unconsciously with a series of inferences. He 
calls the process "guided rapid unconscious re­
configuration." The process is guided in the 
sense that the artist designs the experience, and 
unconscious because we are not aware of the 
steps involved. Seamon also stresses that this 
process is pleasurable. 
Seamon has captured an important aspect of 
our pleasurable experience of poetry. But is it 
complete? Does this entirely explain the source 
of our pleasure? Contrast Seamon's theory with 
the Indian theory of poetry called rasa theory. 19 
Rasa theory, like Seamon's, emphasizes the plea­
sure gained from literary works. However, rasa 
theory places its entire emphasis on the transfor­
mation of emotions, rather than on cognitive in­
ference. Rasa originally meant the flavor one 
gets from tasting the juice of a fruit. It also refers 
to the essence of a thing and to spiritual delight. 
In aesthetics it refers to a kind of objectified plea­
sure. The poet produces a work charged with a 
dominant emotion. This, accompanied by sub­
sidiary emotions, produces a certain overall taste 
or flavor in the reader/viewer (rasa theory was 
originally developed for drama, but was then ex­
tended to all ofliterature ). The dominant emotion 
is objectified and enjoyed as an ideal content. Ev­
eryday feelings are purified, somewhat like ca­
tharsis in Greek tragedy. Rasa is achieved in the 
viewer because the dominant emotion is freed 
from the unpleasant effects which would attend 
such an emotion in everyday life. The feelings of
everyday life are recollected and lived through 
again, but at another level. They become general­
ized, and do not belong to anyone. This process 
leads, in its most profound form, to a state of ec­
stasy. 
There seems to be some truth in rasa theory 
not only for Indian poetry but for poetry in gen­
eral. The theory shares some qualities with West­
em expression theories of art, although it avoids 
the disadvantages of crude versions of expression 
theory.'" It is, in my view, somewhat more plausi­
ble than Seamon's theory in that it explains why 
literature seems to give us a different kind of
value than jokes. The truth probably lies in a 
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combination of the two theories: capturing both 
the cognitive and the emotional sides of our plea-
sure. 
21 
Rasa theory does not depend on the belief that 
ultimate reality is determinant, but rather on the 
belief that it is indeterminate. Seamon, by con­
trast, understands aesthetic experience somewhat 
mechanically in terms of a series of inferential 
steps. Since naive realism requires that reality be 
ultimately distinct, these steps must be distinct. 
Seamon knows that we do not actually experi­
ence these steps, and so he posits them as uncon­
scious.12 There is no denying that conscious infer­
ences play an important part in the pleasures of 
reading poetry, but this does not mean that uncon­
scious processes are equally inferential, or un­
derstandable in terms of clear and distinct steps. 
Unconscious reconfiguration may have a much 
more organic and emotional quality. If poetic 
pleasure was just a matter of pleasure taken in 
rapid unconscious puzzle-solving, then there 
would be no room for savoring the transforma­
tion of mood that rasa theory describes. 
Colin Martindale's article exemplifies an ex­
treme version of naive realism, one that bears a 
striking resemblance to old-time positivism." He 
holds that humanistic inquiry is not as effective as 
scientific inquiry, that the only meaningful ques­
tions are empirical questions, that only science 
can answer these questions, and that literary the­
orists know nothing of how to test their hypothe­
ses. He thinks he can show empirically, contra 
deconstructionists and others, that people pretty 
much agree in their interpretations ofliterature. 
Yet the logic of Martindale's argument is 
questionable. He admits that every published in­
terpretation of Hamlet differs from every other. 
This should indicate that disagreement of inter­
pretation is quite widespread. However 
Martindale responds with the totally ad hoc hy­
pothesis that such differences are due only to the 
academic pressure for novelty. No empirical evi­
dence is given for this claim, or for the fact that 
people in informal literature discussion groups 
often have differing interpretations despite the 
lack of pressure to publish something novel. 
More problematic is his method for testing 
agreement. Martindale simply assumes that 
agreement in responses to ratings on 7 -point 
scales is agreement in interpretation. Normally 
we think of an interpretation of a literary work as 
a substantial written account. For example, an es-
say on Hamlet might provide an interpretation of 
that play. But, as Martindale notes, there is no 
easy way to quantify such responses. This is why 
he uses 7 -point scales. Martindale recognizes 
that some people will have problems with data 
derived simply from subject responses to rat­
ing-scaled questions, and so he has an additional 
experiment in which his student subjects are 
asked to write about a poem. They are given five 
minutes to read the poem and fifteen minutes to 
write about it. Five and fifteen minutes! To call 
such products "interpretations" is generous at 
best, as any professor who has read similar ef­
forts can attest. 
One may grant that Martindale has given 
some reason to believe that for some very 
low-level types of interpretation there is more 
agreement than one might expect. He seems right 
to criticize anyone who says there is equal dis­
agreement at all levels of interpretation. But none 
of this supports his claim that disagreements 
among academics, who have spent considerably 
more than 15 minutes on the works they interpret, 
is due simply to the pressure for novelty. His con­
clusion that "the point of enterprises such as 
deconstructionism is ... rather unclear" is there­
fore sadly unsupported. Martindale's methodol­
ogy is based on the notion that the world is ulti­
mately distinct (for example that "x's 
interpretation ofy" is quantifiable in terms of dis­
tinct properties correspondent to answers to 
questions with seven-point scales) which, as I 
have noted, is characteristic of naive realism.24 
For the sake of completeness I will mention 
the other articles in the issue. Some of these do 
not make naive realist assumptions but have a 
similar theoretical slant to articles already dis­
cussed. Eva T. H. Brann insists that teachers 
should make students read what is good (what is 
good is good!) and that the author is the last court 
of appeal for interpretations. (This, again, treats 
both value and interpretation in naive realist 
terms.)'' Francis Sparshott rips into Edward 
Said's politically inspired interpretive method, 
showing that a close reading of Austen's 
Mansfield Park and Kipling's Kim does not show 
everything explainable in terms of Western impe­
rialism.26 (I have no problem with Sparshott's 
thesis, unless he is trying to make the more gen­
eral point that politically inspired interpretation 
is always wrong-headed.) Ihab Hassan also in­
veighs against politically motivated criticism, 
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holding that the current obsession with power in 
the university skews our values." Finally, Eric 
Miller opposes the poststructuralist idea that all 
literature is self-referential. 28 
Of course not all of the articles fit into the new 
realist mode, for example Michael Wood's article 
on Kafka and Martha Nussbaum's on Bronte.29 I 
have not attempted to incorporate the book re­
views into this analysis. 
Conclusion 
My aim in this essay has been to show that na­
ive realism has its limits. My point is somewhat 
like Kant's. The stuff that goes on beyond the cat­
egories of the understanding is not understand­
able by science but is. still important to us. The 
aesthetic ideas, which Kant saw as essential to 
the fine arts and in particular to poetry, give us a 
strange sort of access to the supersensible realm. 
Why? On my view, it is because this realm (mis­
named and misplaced by Kant because it is not 
really beyond sense, only beyond that aspect of 
the world understandable in terms of clear and 
distinct ideas) has a metaphorical structure simi­
lar to that of aesthetic ideas themselves. Kant 
would have recognized that a scientific or sci­
ence-like conception of philosophy, advocated 
by Haack and others in this issue of Philosophy 
and Literature, is no less problematic than 
Rorty's reduction of philosophy to mere conver­
sation. My suggestion is that we need a bit of this 
Kantian skepticism applied today to naive real­
tsm. 
ENDNOTES 
1. Philosophy and Literature 20th Anniversary 20:2 ( 1996}. 
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